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Introduction
In December 2013 a new war began in South Sudan. Peace 
initiatives over the following eighteen months culminated in an 
agreement between government and armed opposition, which 
was signed in August 2015. The agreement came into effect in late 
2015, but many uncertainties surround its implementation. 
The war that began in 2013 is the third in South Sudan’s short 
post-colonial history. Do previous conflicts and agreements hold 
useful lessons for the current situation? Historic peace agreements 
in South Sudan were the subject of a series of public lectures at 
Juba University in 2014, which were organised by the Rift Valley 
Institute and the Center for Peace and Development Studies. Three 
agreements were discussed: the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, 
which brought the first civil war in the South to an end; the Wunlit 
Conference of 1999, which opened the way for reconciliation of 
the two factions of the SPLA; and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), which ushered in the process leading to inde-
pendence for South Sudan in 2011. 
Academics, activists, church representatives and others 
discussed critical questions raised by these three agreements. 
Why do negotiations succeed or fail? When do opportunities for 
peace present themselves? What is the role of civil society? And 
what are the implications of these agreements for the present 
situation? This publication is based on papers presented over the 
three evenings of lectures at Juba University and transcripts of the 
discussions that ensued.
The lectures attracted an audience of several hundred students 
and members of the public. The speakers included Oliver Albino, 
one of the last surviving negotiators of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
Dr Lam Akol, Chairman of the SPLM-DC (Sudan People’s Libera-
tion Movement-Democratic Change) and Emeritus Bishop Paride 
Taban.
The lecture series was opened by the Vice Chancellor of the 
University, Dr John Akec, who reminded attendees of the impor-
tance of open debate for political process. Dr Douglas Johnson, 
the distinguished historian of South Sudan, began the session on 
the 1972 Addis accord with an account of the twelve days of talks 
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between the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and the 
Government of Sudan based on the minutes of the negotiations. 
The political implications of the agreement were discussed by Dr 
Lam Akol and RVI Fellow Dr Alfred Sebit Lokuji, Deputy Vice-Chan-
cellor of the University. Oliver Albino described the atmosphere 
in Addis Ababa and his own role in the negotiations. He described 
himself modestly as ‘having been picked from nowhere because 
others dropped out.’
The second evening of the lecture series examined the Wunlit 
Peace and Reconciliation Conference of 1999. The Wunlit meeting 
brought together customary leaders from the Nuer of Western 
Upper Nile and the Dinka of the Lakes region, with observers from 
other areas of the South, signalling an end to eight years of South-
on-South violence. The opening speakers were John Ashworth, 
advisor to the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), whose three 
decades of experience go back to the years before the second civil 
war, and Naomi Pendle, a British researcher working on the history 
of inter-tribal peace meetings and customary law. 
The chair of the session on Wunlit, RVI Fellow Dr Leben Moro, 
Dean of External Affairs at the University, introduced contributions 
from three other speakers: First, Bishop Paride Taban; then, Dr 
Judith McCallum, head of Saferworld’s Horn of Africa Programme, 
whose research has focused on the impact of the civil war in South 
Sudan on community identity; and finally Dr Julia Duany, Vice 
Chancellor of the John Garang Memorial University, who together 
with her late husband, Dr Michael Wal Duany, was one of the 
organising secretariat of the Wunlit conference.
The panellists detailed the logistical difficulties associated 
with the organisation of a people-to-people peace process and 
the importance of preparation and implementation. Despite 
the destructive effect of war on social relations, as detailed by 
Dr Duany, the success of the community-led dialogue at Wunlit, 
demonstrated the strength of the metaphor employed by Bishop 
Paride Taban. ‘The politicians are the fish, the civil population the 
water.’
The discussion on the final evening, chaired by RVI Executive 
Director John Ryle, focused on the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) of 2005. The lead speaker was David Deng, 
Research Director of the South Sudan Law Society, who addressed 
the question of the limits of the transitional process following the 
CPA and the unfinished business of peace. The other speakers were 
Don Bosco Malish, Programme Officer in Juba for the Open Society 
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Initiative in Eastern Africa (OSIEA); Census Kabang Lo-liyong, an 
environmental management specialist; and Dr Douglas Johnson.
The discussion pointed to a lack of implementation of key 
elements of the CPA as the root cause of the current social and 
political breakdown in South Sudan. In particular, David Deng 
drew attention to the failure of the government in the transitional 
period in implementing a process of national reconciliation and 
healing. The presentations inspired an energetic floor debate, 
revealing the strength of feeling evoked by the CPA in the context 
of the present conflict.
The first of many speakers from the floor, the South Sudanese 
writer Taban Lo-liyong, posed the central question of the current 
situation: ‘After our independence, how do we live together as a 
nation?’
As South Sudan struggles to find an answer to the current 
internal conflict, the lectures made it clear that it is necessary to 
look backwards as well as forwards. The three historic peace agree-
ments examined in the lecture series represent a range of different 
ways of reaching a political settlement, each with its successes and 
failures—and each with implications for the future of the country.
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1. Addis Ababa Peace Agreement (1972)
Sponsored by the World Council of Churches, the 1972 Addis Ababa 
Agreement was the outcome of talks in Ethiopia between the 
Nimeiri government and representatives of the Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SSLM). The agreement ended the First 
Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), established the Southern Region 
and brought a decade of relative peace. This ended in 1983 with 
President Nemeiri’s abrogation of key elements of the agreement.
John Akec
The taste of freedom
I remember when the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed. I was 
just a boy, in my third year of primary school. I remember running 
to the dusty airport in my village in Gogrial to receive General Lagu 
and Kuol Amum. They addressed us on the airstrip, saying that this 
agreement was for us, the young generation. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement brought autonomy for South 
Sudan for the first time. It brought a parliament and an executive, 
which had a very limited budget. For ten years we had a taste of 
freedom. Really, we were free. The army moved away, the police 
were moved, and we only had South Sudanese ruling over us.
The Addis Ababa agreement shows us that democracy can only 
come about when you give people room to debate issues. Politics 
is to be debated and discussed. Although you may not always see 
progress being made… 
Douglas Johnson
The lessons of the agreement
The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was both a peace settlement to 
end fighting in Sudan’s first civil war and a political settlement. A 
political settlement was necessary to be able to bring about an end 
to the fighting. The negotiations were successful, but in the long 
term the agreement was not. 
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The success of the negotiations was based on the fact that 
both the Government of Sudan and the Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SSLM) were serious about negotiating. Both sides had 
to overcome internal opposition to the negotiations. There were 
senior figures in the Sudanese government and army as well as in 
the Anyanya movement who were opposed to any negotiations 
taking place, and the leadership had to overcome or even override 
these objections in order to send delegations to Addis Ababa. 
Direct negotiations had been preceded by a series of prelimi-
nary indirect talks through intermediaries in the All Africa Council 
of Churches (AACC) and World Council of Churches (WCC) who 
went back and forth between the different sides. Also, there were 
a number of South Sudanese individuals, whom we would now call 
stakeholders, who were living abroad but were not part of either 
the government or the exile movement. These people were also 
brought in to the indirect negotiations.1
Unlike the 1965 Round Table Conference, when political 
parties met for the first time to discuss ‘the Southern Problem,’ 
no time limit was set. The WCC informed Abel Alier, then Minister 
for Southern Affairs, that the SSLM had appointed a delegation for 
‘negotiations to continue till a solution is found.’2
What lessons can be drawn from this summary of the 1972 
Addis Ababa talks?
Firstly, despite opposition within both the government and 
SSLM, and reservations on both sides during the negotiations, the 
two delegations were in fact committed to reaching an agreement. 
In other words they entered into negotiations with serious intent, 
not to play for time.
Secondly, the negotiating delegations were unbalanced, not 
only in numbers but in expertise. The government side included 
several representatives from the military, as well as persons with 
expertise in administration and finance. The SSLM delegation 
did not have equal representation in those fields, especially for 
the military and the economy. Lagu had tried to strike a regional 
balance within southern Sudan, but Bahr el-Ghazal was under-rep-
resented. This had a bearing on the balance in the agreement, 
especially in economic matters.
Thirdly, the moderator’s interventions at strategic moments 
kept the negotiations on track: at times summarising points made 
in order to move the discussion on; at other times asking the dele-
gations to clarify their positions, refusing to allow discussion to be 
1. Abel Alier, Southern 
Sudan: Too many 
agreements dishonoured, 
Exeter: Ithaca Press, 
1990, 51-92; Joseph Lagu, 
Sudan, Odyssey through a 
State: From ruin to hope, 
Omdurman: M.O.B. Center 
for Sudanese Studies, 2006, 
239-47.
2. Alier, Southern Sudan, 95.
‘Despite opposition 
within both the 
government 
and SSLM, and 
reservations on 
both sides, the two 
delegations were 
in fact committed 
to reaching an 
agreement.’
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side-tracked; sometimes breaking for prayer to allow tempers to 
cool; and finally sharply reminding them that the discussions could 
end in failure.
Fourth, the role of the Ethiopian government was more indirect. 
It offered a safe and neutral venue for the talks, Haile Selassie gave 
his advice only when appealed to, and delivered his opinion diplo-
matically, but unambiguously. His position as a respected elder 
statesman of Africa meant that what he said mattered, and there 
was no recourse to coercion. There is no pan-African statesman of 
similar stature today.
Fifth, there were other southern Sudanese ‘stakeholders’ 
present as observers, who played no direct role in the formal 
negotiations, but whose influence would have been felt in informal 
discussions outside the negotiations.
Sixth, all the texts that were discussed and agreed were drafted 
by the negotiating delegations in their committees, rather than 
drafted by an external mediator. However, the brevity of the final 
document allowed for different interpretations of how it was to be 
implemented. This is one reason why, in the CPA negotiations, the 
different protocols were spelled out in great detail.
Seventh, an agreement on the administrative arrangements 
for the southern region was quickly reached, whereas most of the 
time was spent arguing about security and the composition of the 
army. This was a lesson the SPLM/SPLA learned when it insisted 
on retaining a separate army for the South in the CPA negotiations.
Finally, there was the focus on ‘the Southern Problem’. When 
the agreement was published, it was under the rubric, ‘A Solution 
for the Southern Problem’. This was a fundamental weakness of 
the mandate of the negotiations. Ezboni Mondiri and Lawrence 
Wol Wol tried to open up the discussion to include a solution for 
the whole country, but they were hampered by the fact that the 
SSLM itself had never made this one of their political goals and 
the government delegation had not come prepared to discuss a 
broader solution. Mansour Khalid was reported to have regretted 
this later, saying that, had they had accepted some federal formula 
for the whole country, it would have been impossible for Nimeiri 
to abrogate the agreement later.
 ‘When the 
agreement was 
published, it 
was under the 
rubric, “A Solution 
for the Southern 
Problem”. This was 
the fundamental 
weakness of the 
mandate of the 
negotiations.’
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Alfred Lokuji
Why the Addis Ababa Agreement could not last
Was the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 a substantive 
engagement between the parties with the aim of pursuing a 
sustainable peace, or simply a Khartoum government exercise in 
public relations? If a party to a conflict seeks only to postpone 
military defeat or to improve its positions in the battlefield, it 
might be described as buying time. While an unsuccessful peace 
deal may not necessarily be evidence of buying time, other actions 
can indicate when there is a failure to meet the necessary condi-
tions for sustainable peace. 
My approach is one that might best be described as an autopsy 
of the Addis Ababa agreement. It is increasingly evident from the 
brief history of post-colonial independent Sudan—and now South 
Sudan—that its peace agreements represent strategies to buy 
time in order to regain military advantage rather than a genuine 
and sustainable resolution of conflict. 
Discourse on the Sudanese conflicts between government and 
anti-government forces has generally worked on the assumption 
that putting an end to conflict is not just desirable but possible, 
regardless of the types of party to the conflict or the type of 
government in power. In the case of the Addis Ababa agreement 
little attention has been paid to the strategies Nimeiri used to 
undermine the agreement. 
Four factors in particular act as predictors of whether a peace 
is genuine or just buying time: the character of the regime, inter-
national partners, style of leadership, and cessation of hostilities. 
I look at each one in turn.
Was the philosophical or ideological stance of the Nimeiri 
government democratic or autocratic, dogmatic or pluralistic? A 
dogmatic socialist ideology seemed to colour all actions of the 
regime, especially after the establishment of the government 
party, the Sudanese Socialist Union.
Later on, during the rapprochement with the religious leaders 
of Sudan—the precursors to the Islamists—religion took the 
dominant position. With such a stance, based on dogma rather 
than on equality before the law, conflict with enemies becomes 
mandatory. And peace overtures become tactical moves.
International partners as observers, arbitrators, facilitators, 
enforcers and witnesses to a peaceful resolution of conflict are 
essential if a peace agreement is to be worth the paper it is 
‘It is increasingly 




to buy time in order 
to regain military 
advantage rather 
than a genuine 
and sustainable 
resolution of conflict.’ 
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written on. The 1947 Juba Conference, for example, though not a 
peace agreement, would not have been so well-remembered 
if it were not for the presence of the colonial organizers of that 
conference.3
By contrast, the June 1966 Committee to the Chairman of the 
Round Table Conference on the South had no outside observer or 
witness as a signatory. It is no wonder that the conference bore 
no fruit. Attempts at peace within Sudan by Sudanese alone, to 
the exclusion of international observers, such as the 1965 Round-
table Conference, have never succeeded in bringing about lasting 
peace. 
The Addis Ababa agreement had witnesses. This was a good 
start if peace was to be sustained. Unlike the CPA, though, it 
lacked the economic, legal, and diplomatic wherewithal amongst 
the witnesses to enforce the agreement and hold the parties 
accountable, should any of them fail to live up to the terms of the 
agreement.
The leadership and decision-making style of the leaders of the 
conflicting parties may matter a great deal.
In the case of Sudan, the first characteristic of the leaders is 
that they were military men. This is true of General Jaafar Nimeiri 
and General Joseph Lagu, and was true of General Omar Bashir, 
Commander Riek Machar in the Khartoum Peace Agreement 
of 1997, and John Garang de Mabior, Commander in Chief and 
Chairman of the SPLA. An autocratic leader is not beholden to his 
people or to his military advisers, who may have no say in whether 
the peace or a ceasefire should be sustained or not. 
The other characteristic when we talk of ceasefire, is whether 
our leaders are genuine. Ceasefires can easily turn out to be mech-
anisms for a lull in the fighting, to prevent further losses of ground, 
or to regain strength through the re-stocking of weaponry. There 
are many more declarations than actual instances of peace. This 
is the essence of Abel Alier’s argument in Too Many Agreements 
Dishonoured.
John Garang warned the Anyanya forces in 1972:
Any Southerner who holds the mistaken view that Arab Nation-
alism, now sincere … gives the South local autonomy in good 
faith, and that this autonomy will be guaranteed by a few 
phrases scribbled on some sheets of paper … christened ‘The 
Constitution’—that Southerners either suffers from acute 
historical myopia or else, advocates the treasonable stand of 
3. Minutes of the Juba 
Conference, EP/SCR/1.A.5/1, 
Juba, 21 June 1947.
 ‘The leadership 
and decision-making 
style of the leaders 
of the conflicting 
parties may matter a 
great deal.’
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opportunism, national subjugation, and continual Arab chauvin-
ism and domination. In short, such Southerner calls for surrender 
in a camouflaged form.4
To have positive peace, you level the ground for all citizens 
to enjoy the political, economic, social, cultural benefits that the 
nation can afford. That did not happen.
There are people who romanticise the Addis Ababa agreement 
and the self-government period in South Sudan. But there was 
a high level of interference from Khartoum at that time, and 
having the Anyanya forces fully integrated in the national army 
left the South without any sort of military guarantee. This allowed 
Khartoum to continue with business as usual.
In 1972, while a Captain in the Anyanya Army, John Garang 
argued that the Nimeiri regime was entering into negotiations 
‘just for the purpose of lengthening its own days of breath.’5 In 
the agreement, the autonomous government of Southern Sudan 
would have its own executive, its own legislature. And yet, when 
Nimeiri did not like the legislature, he dissolved it. Is that true 
autonomy? Does that tell you that Nimeiri was sincere in estab-
lishing an autonomous government for Southern Sudan? 
The only reason the Addis Ababa Agreement lasted from 1972 
to 1983 is that we in the South had been suffering for so long that 
we thought there was no way but up. The South had to take it in 
good faith. It turned out that it was a false hope. 
Lam Akol
Necessary conditions for making peace
Peace agreements are not made between friends. Agreements are 
between people fighting each other, who necessarily don’t trust 
each other. We can assume each side will try to get the most it can 
from the final settlement. But for any agreement to succeed, at 
least four conditions must be satisfied.
Firstly, there must be a stalemate in the conflict. Anything 
that contributes to the war effort must have reached a stalemate, 
be it military, political, or diplomatic. If not, one of the sides will 
continue to believe that it can still gain on the battlefield.
Although secret negotiations between Khartoum and Anyanya 
representatives started as early as May 1971, it was not until after 
the coup and counter-coup of 1971 that the process crystallised 
into a genuine search for peaceful settlement. By the second 
4. John Garang, Letter from 
The General Headquarters, 
Anyanya National Armed 
Forces, South Sudan, to 
The Commander in Chief 
Anyanya National Armed 
Forces, Leader of the 
Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement, Members of the 
Anyanya SSLM Negotiation 
Committee, 24 January 
1972.
5. Garang, Letter to Anyanya 
Forces, 24 January 1972.
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half of 1971, internal conditions within the Government and the 
Anyanya combined with external factors to render the search for 
peace the best option for the two sides. 
By 1971, Nimeiri had lost the support of the Soviet Union, Arab 
socialists and the Eastern Bloc and had begun to look to the West 
for help. The West was intent on a peaceful settlement in South 
Sudan, and had set certain parameters for assisting Nimeiri. This 
had an effect within Sudan. When Nimeiri lost the Communist 
party’s support, he became politically very vulnerable, and began 
looking for an alliance with the Southern forces. 
To the south, the coming to power of Idi Amin in Uganda in 
1971 deprived Nimeiri of the support of Obote, who had been 
ruthless against the Anyanya. Amin’s support for the Anyanya 
movement helped to create a condition of stalemate.
But the push for peace also worked against the Anyanya in that 
they would lose support from activists and refugees in neighbour-
ing countries, especially Zaire and Uganda. After the signing of the 
agreement on 27 February, Lagu discovered that these countries 
were pushing him to sign a peaceful settlement. His back was 
exposed. 
The second condition is this: you must have a facilitator or 
a mediator who enjoys the trust of and has influence with the 
parties. In the case of Addis Ababa, this was Burgess Carr. 
The first serious attempt for mediation in the problem of the 
war in Sudan was made by the Movement for Colonial Freedom 
(MCF), which was affiliated to the Parliamentary Labour Party in 
Britain. Its Secretary-General, Barbara Haq, was given the respon-
sibility of mediating in the conflict and began to meet with Mading 
de Garang, on the side of the Southern rebels. But she came to 
be perceived as actively supporting Joseph Garang and her role 
came to an abrupt end: Mading would have nothing more to do 
with the MCF. 
In 1971, the WCC and the ACC enjoyed respect and influence 
on both sides, with the Government and with the Anyanya. On 
15 May 1971, they visited Khartoum, they met with Abel Alier, 
who was the Acting Minister for Southern Affairs, and Abdulgasim 
Hashim, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. They met later and 
submitted six points to the Anyanya as the basis of the agreement. 
These were taken to Mading de Garang in London, who then 
communicated with Joseph Lagu. The Government wanted to 
ascertain if the Anyanya were ready to negotiate within a united 
Sudan. On 30 October 1971, Joseph Lagu wrote to Mading saying, 
‘You must have 
a facilitator or a 
mediator who enjoys 
the trust of and 
has influence with 
the parties.’
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‘You can now tell the Government that we are ready to negotiate 
within a united Sudan.’ Things began to move quickly.
The third condition for success is that negotiators must enjoy 
the trust and confidence both of their principals and also of the 
rank and file of their organisation if they are to deliver what they 
put their name to in peace agreements.
The question of people to trust as negotiators was a problem 
for the Anyanya. The SSLM delegation—of which Oliver Albino 
was a member—was headed by Ezboni Mondiri. Ezboni was 
effectively dismissed by General Lagu when Lagu came to Addis 
Ababa in March 1972, intending to re-negotiate the terms of the 
Agreement. But there was pressure on Lagu to sign the peace 
agreement. Ultimately, when he went to meet Emperor Haile 
Selassie to discuss these matters, the only concession he could 
achieve was that the 6,000 Southerners to be incorporated into 
the national army should be Anyanya, rather than Southerners. He 
then signed the agreement. 
The fourth and final necessity is that there must be some 
common ground to make a peace agreement possible. The 
Anyanya was calling for a separate South while the government of 
Sudan wanted a united country. When Lagu agreed that there was 
room for a settlement within a united Sudan the peace agreement 
was possible. 
For the Anyanya, though, it was not easy to abandon their 
call for a separate South. Most of the opposition came from this 
angle. It was not easy either for Nimeiri to sell a ceasefire ‘cool-
ing-off period’ to the military in the north, nor the concept of 
sharing power with rebels who had until recently been seen as 
highwaymen. 
The Agreement did not fail because of anything intrinsic to 
the agreement, rather, it failed because of its application—mostly 
because the condition of stalemate was changing. 
The agreement enjoyed initial success. Nimeiri was serious. 
He worked hard to see that agreement succeed. For him, it was 
a guarantee of his survival. Having lost political support from the 
North, he began to rely on the South. And in many cases, he did 
things that went beyond the conditions of the agreement. For 
example, he asked Lagu to nominate 200 soldiers from his army 
to join his Republican Guard, the force which later helped foil 
coups in 1975 and 1976 against Nimeiri’s regime. Things began to 
change in 1977 however, when he made the National Reconcilia-
tion Agreement with the opposition in the North—Sadiq al Mahdi 
‘The agreement did 
not fail because of 
anything intrinsic 
to the agreement, 
rather, it failed 
because of the 
application.’
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and Turabi. From that time onwards, in relation to the south, he 
became more confrontational.
Yet, from the beginning, there was a lack of pluralism in the 
implementation of the agreement. The fact that the SSLM did 
not insist on its own continuation meant everyone joined the 
SSU, Nimeiri’s Sudan Socialist Union. The unity of the South as 
one entity was threated by the divisions and wrangling among 
Southern politicians over power in this one party. And then finally, 
there was a lack of development. Development and peace go 
together. If you have no development, peace is threatened, and 
there was no development in the South.
In a real sense, the Addis Ababa agreement brought peace to 
South Sudan for 11 years. There were only occasional skirmishes 
within the army, such as in Akobo, in 1975, or with Joseph Aguet 
in 1976. 
The agreement was owned by all Southerners. There was no 
separation between ‘liberator’ and ‘liberated’. It was all South-
erners together. Except for the army in some areas, you never 
saw an incident where the Anyanya said, ‘We brought the liber-
ation, so we should do the job.’ There was also an atmosphere of 
healthy democracy, as individuals from rival factions within the 
SSU competed for positions in the Regional Assembly
They managed to form a government from scratch. The interim 
High Executive Council of 12 Ministers started with one office, one 
car. In 1974 it was able to build the current Ministries, the houses 
of the Ministers, and the Assembly. Despite the difficulties of low 
budgets and constant interference from the central government, 
they were able also to develop institutions.
Finally, for the first time, Southern Sudanese had a consider-
able presence in the national army, especially in the officer corps. 
As regards the present situation the first lesson is the issue 
of the supremacy of the political over military. In any libera-
tion movement, it must be the political that directs the military. 
Otherwise, when weapons are laid down, they don’t know what 
to do next. 
The second lesson is that, throughout all the stages of the 
negotiation, it was the national government of the day that took 
the initiative. It was the government that gave the delegation of 
SCC and AACC the six points for the agreement. It was the govern-
ment that gave a suggestion for the framework for discussion. It 
was the government that took a blueprint to Addis. 
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For the agreement to survive, you must have a genuine multi-
party democracy and ownership. Everybody felt they were part 
of the agreement. The Anyanya fought for the Southerners: they 
brought peace for the Southerners, so it must be the Southerners 
who enjoy peace. 
Those who are qualified should take their qualifications and 
use them properly. This was one of the things that the Government 
of the High Executive Council did. They collected Southerners who 
were in the North and brought them to the South, and gave them 
positions based on their qualifications. There was no segregation 
according to whether one had been in the bush or not in the bush, 
whether one had fought or not. It was based on merit.
Oliver Albino
Making peace in Addis Ababa
John Ryle: Oliver Albino, you are one of the few people who can 
talk about what it felt like to arrive in Addis Ababa, the imperial 
capital of Ethiopia in 1972 to negotiate peace. You went, after 
more than a decade of war and suffering in South Sudan, as the 
representative of South Sudanese people, to try to end this long 
period of difficulty in the South. Uncle, I would like you to cast your 
mind back to February 1972, because I think that was a critical 
moment. When you arrived in Addis, did you think that these 
peace talks were going to succeed?
Oliver Albino: No. I didn’t think they would succeed. By then, I had 
already lived too long to be deceived. 
At that time, I was not even supposed to be a member of that 
delegation, but they were short on numbers. Many of the delega-
tion members had refused to take their seats, and I was one of the 
people fished out of the waters to become a member. 
When I arrived, I was a stranger. I was in a place where I had to 
ask for guidance—but there was none. I asked how we were going 
to start—but no one knew. This was perhaps because the whole 
team had been replaced just as we were called to the negotiating 
table. 
That the agreement was going to succeed was something 
impressed on me by the presence of Mansour Khalid, and by the 
confidence he had in Nimeiri’s sincerity. As our relations with the 
North will show, Mansour Khalid became a different man after 
living long enough with Nimeiri. He has since written books about 
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Nimeiri’s insincerity. My confidence, which I built around Mansour 
Khalid’s confidence in Nimeiri, collapsed with his.
To the best of our ability, we did what we could. There were 
pressures on the leadership, and the leadership was also putting 
pressure on us. I was chairman of the political committee. 
Somebody passed on words from General Lagu. He said he 
was happy with work done by the Committee for Financial and 
Economic Affairs, but not by the political committee. We had sold 
out the South, he said. So I was thrown aside as somebody who 
had sold out the South. I decided to not go to the conference for 
three days; those days were spent discussing me.
In the end, Lagu took me aside and told me I was doing fine, but 
the committee was not. I replied, ‘I’m the leader of the committee. 
How can I be doing fine and the committee not?’ Only when the 
committee as a whole was praised did I return. It was playing 
games, but it is how it happened.
Douglas Johnson: Dr Lam emphasised the importance of common 
ground and mentioned also the approach of the Government to 
Lagu and to Mading de Garang on the issue of starting negotiations 
on the basis of a united Sudan. Why did the leadership of the SSLM 
shift their position from total independence of the South, which 
was understood at that time as being what the Anyanya was for, 
to accepting other conditions for negotiations? Was this a debate 
within the leadership? Or was it decided by Lagu and only a few 
people?
Oliver Albino: Well at that time, if you said ‘federation’, people 
would look around to try to see who had said it. And it’s true even 
now, when you ask, ‘What is federation?’ If you ask me, I would 
struggle to explain the idea, even having studied political science. 
Despite that, you could go deep into any village and find people 
talking and singing songs about federation. If we shifted from one 
point to another, people didn’t mind—they knew who we were. 
Particularly in Juba here, people knew, ‘Oliver is there, so it’s OK.’ 
Whether we shifted from position of unity, or onto something 
else, the people knew we were aiming for something they would 
approve. In most cases, this is the principle. 
Alfred Lokuji: As you left Addis with this agreement, and you came 
to establish the Government of South Sudan in the context of 
unity, what were the concerns that you had about the agreement 
at the time? Was there anything that really worried you?
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Oliver Albino: The one or two worries that we had about the 
agreement were never spoken. We had hoped at the time to meet 
our leader, Joseph Lagu, to tell him we were being forced to sign it. 
We wanted to persuade him to refuse and change the agreement 
to what we wanted. This was our aim. But we were never so lucky. 
Lam Akol: My question is related to the SSLM. Why did they not 
raise the issue of their continuation as a political party?
Oliver Albino: That was another thing we wanted Joseph Lagu 
to insist on—the SSLA. It was one of the things we had wanted 
Lagu to hear. Again, we were not so lucky. I have a sense of pride, 
though, being one of the few surviving members of the delega-
tion to the Addis Ababa agreement. I was picked from nowhere, 
because all the other members dropped out. 
Lam Akol: Because they wanted separation!
Oliver Albino: I also wanted separation at that time. But I knew 
that even separation had to be negotiated.
Beny Gideon, South Sudan Human Rights Society for Advocacy: 
Both parties ratified the agreement in Addis Ababa on 27 March. 
How did the people accept it? What was the reaction of the 
people?
Oliver Albino: From what I heard, they were happy. Very happy. 
Of course, politicians criticised the form of agreement we brought, 
saying that it had been tampered with and so on, but the ordinary 
man was happy as long as there was an agreement.
Discussion: The lessons of Addis Ababa
Benjamin Gurogimba: One of the factors that, according to you, Dr 
Lam, is necessary if an agreement is to be reached is a stalemate. 
Where are we currently with regards to a stalemate?
Lam Akol: The question of stalemate has many facets. You could 
have military stalemate, political stalemate, diplomatic stalemate, 
and so on. My own analysis of the situation at the moment is that 
there is no military stalemate, and that’s why the parties think they 
can slog it out in the field. But they are facing difficulties in other 
arenas. So whether they will be wise enough to see that military 
factors alone will not be able to deliver anything, remains to be 
seen.
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John Ryle: What is the one lesson from the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
positive or negative, about the agreement, or its implementation, 
that is important for us to bear in mind for the current peace talks?
Douglas Johnson: I think that the most important thing that we’ve 
got to ask is, what is the seriousness of the opposing sides in nego-
tiating? Is there any common ground? Have we reached a point yet 
where the popular will can be heard and have any impact on the 
negotiating sides?
Oliver Albino: The difference between the trouble now and the 
Addis Ababa agreement is that we were making an agreement to 
change borders. We considered those people as completely alien, 
as people who could not understand our politics. Those people 
were different from us, our problem with them was political. Now, 
although we are the same people, it is politics that has brought 
the trouble. 
In both cases, the war is political, and we have got to look at it 
politically. Even if it is tribal, we must look at it politically. If a Nuer 
takes a spear or a gun and shoots a Dinka, what is his reason? It is 
not just because one is Dinka and one is Nuer. It is politics. 
Do not get hatred into your politics. Many of the things I have 
seen are driven by hate; the original motives are lost. 
Alfred Lokuji: Khartoum and Nimeiri paid a price to buy peace in 
South Sudan, going through the motions of sharing power. But the 
idea that we were now a Sudan where all are citizens were equal 
on every definition of citizenship, was not present in the Sudanese 
mind. That never happened. 
The lesson is that if peace is pinned on the efforts of one 
person who is willing to make certain sacrifices in order to prolong 
his regime or his party, the political system has to move fast to 
get ideas into society. Otherwise, peace will collapse very quickly. 
Today, the greatest problem is that we have pinned our 
problems on individuals. We don’t recognise the systemic nature 
of the problem. We have to think about ways of solving problems 
as South Sudanese together. Individuals are always going to be 
willing to pay short-term prices in order to appear to have won in 
any situation, but these will not be lasting solutions.
Lam Akol: The most remarkable thing about Addis Ababa was the 
ownership of the agreement by the people of South Sudan. I’m 
happy that the SSLM did not negotiate itself into the agreement. 
Negotiating yourself into an agreement is the surest way to disaster. 
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I hope future agreements will only be about what needs to be 
done in South Sudan, and don’t negotiate individuals, political 
parties, or groups into the text of the agreement.
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2. Wunlit Peace Conference (1999)
A split in the SPLA leadership in 1991 led to inter-tribal violence 
in many parts of the South. In 1999, the New Sudan Council of 
Churches (NSCC) organised the Wunlit Peace and Reconciliation 
Conference, which brought together customary authorities from 
the Nuer of Western Upper Nile and the Dinka of Bahr al-Ghazal. 
The resolution of conflict between these communities that was 
negotiated at Wunlit prepared the ground for the reunification of 
the SPLA in 2002
John Ashworth
A long-term, grass-roots approach
You could say that the People-to-People process, which culmi-
nated in the Wunlit conference, began in 1991. That year, there 
was a split in the SPLM between Dr John Garang and Dr Riek 
Machar, which would go on to have terrible consequences. Right 
from the very beginning, the church began to try to reconcile the 
two protagonists. We have to say, sadly, that we failed. 
The people-to-people process began in 1997. After reflec-
tion, the churches decided that, as we had already failed to bring 
together the two doctors, we ought to start at the grassroots. 
So in 1998, we brought together a group of Dinka and Nuer 
chiefs from the West Bank of the Nile. We brought them to Loki-
chogio, which was a safe place, and that was a key meeting that 
set the scene for the rest of the people-to-people process. They 
agreed, ‘We can’t keep on killing each other; we’re going to finish 
each other.’ 
After that meeting, they went back to start mobilising the 
people and start spreading that message amongst their own 
people. The church also had its own peace mobilisers, with the 
New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), founded by Bishop Paride 
Taban, leading this process.
One of the very vital parts was exchange visits between chiefs. At 
that time, for Dinka chiefs to go into a Nuer area, or for Nuer chiefs 
to go into a Dinka area, was practically suicide. But as a result 
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of the chiefs’ meeting in Lokichogio, they started going to each 
others’ territory, and quite a few people said, ‘Now I have seen a 
chief from the enemy coming safely to my own area. Now I know 
there is a serious peace process which is going on.’ 
The first big conference occurred in 1999, and that was the 
Dinka–Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference, 
which was held in Wunlit. 
The first point I would like to emphasise is that everyone talks 
about Wunlit, but I’ve been talking to you about the years before 
Wunlit. People-to-people peace is not about conferences. Even 
today you will find many people who are trying to raise money 
for their peace and reconciliation initiative, telling you it’s based 
on the people-to-people principle. But if it’s just a conference, it’s 
not people-to-people. 
People-to-people requires months and indeed years of mobil-
isation and awareness raising, working with chiefs, elders, and 
women. It’s that grassroots process that makes people-to-people, 
not conferences. The conferences of course are important, but 
a conference without the prior grassroots process is a complete 
waste of time and money. We know that because we’ve seen 
hundreds of them in South Sudan over the last few years. 
Wunlit brought together, in total, about 2,000 people. A new 
village had to be built in a place that had nothing. Boreholes had to 
be drilled, an airstrip made, security had to be provided. 
There were key moments during the Wunlit meeting, such 
as the slaughtering of a white bull, Mabior. Mabior fought hard 
before he was killed, and that was seen as a good sign by the 
people gathered together. This was not an easy bull; this was a 
tough bull. It had been slaughtered as a symbol of peace. 
A major part of the process was that each side had the chance 
to tell its story. They talked about ‘vomiting out’ all the bitterness, 
hatred and anger, so each side could say what the other side did to 
them. Then the other side has the chance to say their side of the 
story. Eventually, people realise it’s the same story—what you’re 
doing to us, we are doing to you—and the suffering is on all sides.
From that process, you move on to an agreement of how we 
go forward. What has to be done to repair the damage and to 
bring about reconciliation? At Wunlit, peace councils were set up 
to address new incidents before they got out of hand. 
We then moved to the East Bank. We had two conferences: 
one in 1999 in Waat, one in 2000 in Lilir. 
‘There were key 
moments during the 
Wunlit meeting, such 
as the slaughtering 
of the white bull, 
Mabior … This was 
not an easy bull; 
this was a tough 
bull. It had been 
slaughtered as a 
symbol of peace.’ 
JUBA UNIVERSITY LECTURES 201424
After those meetings, we held a meeting that we called 
strategic linkages. We brought chiefs and elders and women who 
had been part of all the other conferences together and asked how 
it was going, and what we should do next.
The basic message we got from the people there was, ‘We have 
made peace’—particularly on the West Bank more than on the 
East Bank—‘but it is our sons who are still causing the fighting.’ 
And by their ‘sons’ they meant the two doctors, Dr John and Dr 
Riek. And they told us, ‘If you want to bring reconciliation and 
peace between us, you’ve now got to address our sons.’ 
We didn’t jump straight to addressing Dr John and Dr Riek. We 
went first to a middle level. We had a conference in Kisumu, Kenya, 
where we took chiefs, elders and women from the grassroots to 
Kisumu, but we also invited a lot of the commanders, politicians, 
intellectuals, and others. 
At all these conferences, the women’s contribution was signif-
icant. Over the entire people-to-people process, from Wunlit 
onwards, a third of the delegates were women. At Kisumu I 
remember the women told the men, ‘If you people keep on 
fighting, you’ll kill yourselves, all of you. And then we women will 
use the money from the oil to buy white husbands for ourselves.’ 
The women knew how to get the attention of their men!
The basic message from Kisumu, from both Nuer and Dinka 
communities was, ‘We support the liberation struggle, we support 
Dr John as the leader of the liberation struggle, but Dr John and 
Dr Riek must reconcile.’ Now it wasn’t long afterwards, in early 
2002, when they did reconcile and Riek came back into the SPLM. 
We certainly believe that people-to-people process was a major 
influence in that reconciliation.
I want to mention some of the key elements of the people-to-
people process. 
The first one is the years of patient preparation at the grass-
roots. Part of the work of this long preparation is building trust. 
Telling stories is also very important, and the use of traditional 
reconciliation mechanisms. I’ve already mentioned the slaughter 
of the bull Mabior. There are rich reconciliation mechanisms within 
the local culture of South Sudan. 
Symbolism is very important. This is something that’s often 
forgotten by our Western friends, who are very much focused 
on techniques, matrices and so on. And that’s actually where 
churches are apt, because symbolism and imagery is very much 
part of the religious milieu. 
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Truth-telling—we found this in Wunlit and other conferences, 
after the people have ‘vomited out’ the bitterness and the anger, 
they’re telling the truth. The truth has to be on the table if we’re 
going to make peace.
Another very important part is the acknowledgement that 
the community is the primary actor and the community must be 
ready to take responsibility. There was a key moment when the 
chiefs said, ‘We cannot just keep on blaming other people. We 
have to take responsibility for making peace.’ Any peace which is 
imposed from the outside, whether it’s by IGAD or the Americans 
or UNMISS, will fail. 
The penultimate measure is a signed agreement that has 
practical applications. In our cases, these were things like returning 
stolen cattle, paying compensation for those who had been killed, 
resolving the issue of abducted women and children, setting up a 
community border police force, dealing with the fact that commu-
nities were going to need humanitarian aid and services to get 
back to their homes. 
That was also one of the failures of the Wunlit process. After-
wards, we went to the international donors and NGOs and said, 
‘This is a national priority, can you help us with the practical side 
of helping the people who have made peace?’ They replied, ‘That’s 
not in our strategic plan’, or ‘We don’t work in that area or sector’. 
It’s a real credit to the people of the West Bank that their peace 
lasted for so long, given the lack of interest and support from the 
international community for the hard things that come after the 
conference.
The last thing we discovered was that we were empowering 
people. We hadn’t set out to empower people, we’d set out to 
try and make peace. But this grassroots process had empowered 
people, helping them to take responsibility for themselves, which 
is what they wanted to do.
Studies say that if you want to make peace, you’ve got to look 
at three levels: the grassroots level, the mid-level, and the high-
level. What we tried to do in 1991 was reconciliation at the top 
level. It failed. Dr Riek and Dr Garang were not ready to reconcile. 
After some reflection, we went to the grassroots level. With 
the people-to-people process we worked to bring peace and 
reconciliation at that lowest level.
Then, we had the strategic linkages conference to evaluate. 
There, we were told, ‘We’ve done all we can at our level. We’ve 
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made peace amongst ourselves at our level. You’ve now got to go 
to our sons.’ 
At Kisumu, we brought the intellectuals, the commanders, the 
politicians and a whole range of other people together with the 
grassroots; and this mid-level conference did its work. They came 
up with a resolution that next the top level must reconcile. 
You start with the grassroots, you then move through the 
middle level, with the grassroots putting pressure on the middle, 
and the middle puts pressure on the top. We believe this process 
led to that reconciliation. 
Naomi Pendle
A non-government process
The Wunlit conference was a remarkable event. It was somehow 
able to gather people who didn’t trust each other and bring them 
together, with many people going, scared that they wouldn’t 
return or that they would be killed in the process. The conference 
did many things to which we must come back again and again to 
learn lessons. 
The proceedings of the Wunlit conference were recorded and 
transcribed, and are available online.6 From that resource, I’ve 
taken three features that illuminate how the people who partic-
ipated in the conference understood it. In addition I relate those 
historical features to the present politics in the region.
First of all, Wunlit was viewed as a non-government process. 
It’s important to understand that in South Sudan, the word 
‘government’ can be defined broadly, beyond the specific central 
government of the day. The Dinka language, for example, distin-
guishes between koc hakuma and koc bai—the people of the 
government and the people of the home. Each term refers to a 
sphere of influence. The SPLA, during the Wunlit process, were 
included in peoples’ idea of government. The home, meanwhile, 
is associated with local government, elders and possibly, chiefs, 
although they sit somewhere between the two spheres.
In 1991, the divide in the SPLA was seen as a split in the 
government. But despite being in the government sphere, that 
competition was nonetheless able to mobilise peoples’ home 
communities to fight. 
Many of the ideas of Wunlit concerned the home communities 
taking back control at the local level. Chiefs responded by saying 
6. Wunlit: Dinka–Nuer 
West Bank Peace and 
Reconciliation Conference, 
February 1999. Transcript 
available online at the 
Sudan Open Archive (www.
sudanarchive.net).
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that they were in control of war and peace, and if the home wants 
peace, they can come to that peace irrespective of what’s going 
on in the government. 
During Wunlit, it’s the chiefs and local leaders who speak, 
rather than the politicians. Nhial Deng Nhial, then governor of 
Bahr el-Ghazal, opens the conference by saying they—the SPLA—
are going to take the back seat, and that it’s for other people—the 
home—to do the talking.
But at the same time, the SPLA presence was crucial. In order 
for the conference to take place, Salva Kiir had to give his approval. 
Civil war within the Western Nuer at the time meant that many 
Nuer were seeking refuge in Bahr el-Ghazal and there seemed to 
be obvious benefits for the SPLA in accepting Nuer back. It was 
therefore an easier time for Kiir to accept peace at ‘home’.
It helped that the Bul Nuer, who had a much more distant rela-
tionship to the SPLA, weren’t at the Wunlit conference. Because 
the Bul Nuer areas were under the control of Paulino Matip and 
the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), they weren’t included—
suggesting that the ‘government wars’ at the higher levels still 
somewhat decided who could have peace with whom.
In some readings, peace meetings are a way of governing 
between local groups—and therefore the places where the govern-
ment regulates inter-group relationships.Where you might expect 
to hear chiefs talk about themselves as the ‘home’, a number 
of the older Nuer chiefs at Wunlit referred to the meeting as 
‘government’. Some leaders in Wunlit even began to question the 
distinction between home and government. Politicians in South 
Sudan are still connected to rural, home communities through 
cattle, wives, and property. 
Yet, the relationship between the home and the government 
spheres is complex. In local memory, the CPA period brought 
violence back to Wunlit. In 2005, while people were celebrating a 
peace agreement at the highest government level, Wunlit saw new 
clashes at the local level. 
The second feature of Wunlit is the idea of it as a Nuer–Dinka 
peace process. Much of the discourse emphasises clashes between 
Nuer and Dinka, and how they’ve become progressively more 
violent over time. Salva Kiir, in his opening comments, describes 
its purpose as ending the Nuer–Dinka war. Many chiefs talk about 
how the regulations of war have been broken, blaming Nuer chiefs 
and Dinka chiefs for that. 
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Peace conferences are important for ‘vomiting out’ the truth, 
and in doing so, setting a narrative of the previous conflict (and 
possibly future conflicts too). But ethnicity isn’t the only element 
that could have been highlighted. Some people highlight the 
government–home conflict. Some chiefs even criticise people who 
describe it as a Nuer–Dinka conflict, putting the blame on a broad 
idea of ‘government’.
The coming of the gun—that is, the coming of the govern-
ment—was for some to blame for the conflict. Another chief asks 
‘Chiefs, is this our conflict? No. It is the conflict of the soldiers of 
Garang and those of Riek.’7 This was one of the biggest achieve-
ments of Wunlit—that there was space to air frustration against 
the government of the day. 
The third feature revolves around the question of whether 
Wunlit was a peace meeting or a court case. There’s a very clear 
emphasis throughout that it is the former. Awut Deng says, ‘It is 
not a court. This is a peace meeting.’8 The implication was that this 
wasn’t the time to drag up all past grievances and see if the scales 
balanced, but that this was a time for coming back together.
In most court cases, if compensation is paid and an animal 
is sacrificed, that would come toward the end of the process. 
At Wunlit, it came at the beginning. Nothing else needed to be 
said; there definitely didn’t need to be compensation or a further 
judicial process. 
Wunlit did, however, produce some very clear recommenda-
tions. In particular, it laid the ground for border courts in order to 
have justice again between Nuer communities. But sadly, in most 
areas, those courts were never put in place.
Because there was no attempt at Wunlit to arrange compen-
sation, and because of a lack of these border courts, there is a 
lack of peaceful recourse to justice available to the Dinka and 
Nuer communities today. This raises questions. If you can’t have 
peaceful justice to redress grievances, does that make violent 
justice—revenge—more legitimate? Today it’s very common for 
the Dinka to say that they can never have compensation with the 
Nuer, simply because it’s not practical. 
Perhaps it wasn’t ever going to be possible at Wunlit, but what 
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Judith McCallum
Challenges to the people-to-people process
I worked with Pact Sudan for a number of years, and in that time, 
managed a large people-to-people peace-building programme 
which started in 2002. In that work and after, I’ve observed a 
number of challenges in the people-to-people process.
Firstly, it’s time-consuming and not always straightforward.
Secondly comes the issue of inclusivity—of knowing which 
groups to invite and getting the right balance between groups. 
How do you ensure that you have the right degree of inclusivity at 
the different stages of the process?
Thirdly, there is a need for external resources and logistics—it’s 
expensive to fly people around South Sudan—but that necessarily 
ties you into other agendas and makes you reliant on donors. That 
was a big challenge—and a distraction.
Ownership of this process is critical. There is the potential for 
political and donor capture. I’ve been to many conferences where 
you can’t start the conference until the political leader who’s 
opening it shows up, so you sometimes wait a day or two. While 
there’s a need for the politicians to be there, how important are 
they to driving the process?
In addition, most of the resolutions are beyond the scope of 
the local community to implement. I went to a follow-up confer-
ence in Wunlit in 2011, and they were still talking about resolutions 
that hadn’t been addressed since the original Wunlit conference 
in 1999.
Finally, these conferences come with high expectations. 
Communities come together, they talk, they tell stories, and give 
rise to high expectations. When those expectations are not met, 
because of a lack of follow-up, that can be a driver of conflict and 
frustration. 
The idea in peoples’ minds today is that peace-building is a 
conference rather than a long-term process. How do we move the 
focus back to that process? 
A lot of funding is not long-term in South Sudan. That limits a 
sense of vision. But peace-building as a long-term process needs 
flexibility, it needs time, it needs you to make changes and perhaps 
take divergent paths to the final goal. You need to have time for 
people to talk and share their stories, if healing and reconciliation 
are to happen. And there need to be very clear responsibilities and 
timelines for follow up.
‘These conference 
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There is a focus from donors on results—which is a good thing—
but peace-building is very hard to measure. A lot of research has 
been done to show that Wunlit led to a renewed relationship 
between the Dinka and the Nuer and eventually to the CPA. But 
how do you prove that? 
In conferences I was involved with, we were always limited to 
a certain number of participants. In Sudanese culture, you can’t 
turn someone away, but we had these very specific descriptions 
of who was going to be there. In that situation, how do you keep 
the community involved? 
In one conflict assessment we conducted, one conclusion we 
had was ‘everyone’s a victim’. There’s a sense in a lot of commu-
nities of victimhood and not a sense of responsibility. How do we 
rebuild ownership and responsibility in our peace-building rather 
than treat people as victims? 
What is the role of government in today’s context? Of course 
the government needs to be there, but there’s often a fear of 
politicisation of the people-to-people process, turning it into a 
state-building exercise.
Finally, we need to examine and question our ideas of local 
responsibility and ownership. The role of local leaders and tradi-
tional leaders, in the changing context of Sudanese culture, really 
needs to be examined. 
Julia Duany
Telling it like it is
Something has gone wrong, what do we do? We have to come 
together. People are dying. Children are dying. We are losing our 
property. We have to bring back that life we have lost.
In the people-to-people peace process at Wunlit, what was it 
that brought people to negotiation? Dinka were suffering, their 
cattle were being taken, and the same thing was happening with 
the Nuer. People were dying, young and old. So this pressure 
brought them to the understanding that we had to reconcile and 
restore trust. 
My late husband, Wal Duany, was one of the facilitators of 
Wunlit, along with Bill Lowrey, Dr Nyot Kok and John Luk. You had 
all these Western-educated lawyers, sitting down, asking how they 
were going to deal with all the village people and big chiefs. John 
Luk said, ‘Let us just follow the concept of law.’ Wal said, ‘Luk, are 
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you talking about the concept of an eye for an eye and a tooth for 
a tooth? If so, we are going to turn the Nuers and Dinkas into a 
toothless and eyeless nation.’
The concept of reconciliation is to restore the life of the 
people. As you go through reconciliation, bring back the person 
who has strayed from the community and create consensus about 
the existence of the conflict. 
In reconciliation, you have to take responsibility for something 
you have done wrong. Even the victim, if he has done something 
wrong, will be the first person to go to the kuaar muon (Nuer) or 
beny bith (Dinka), the spiritual elder, and confess, ‘I have killed 
somebody.’ Today, this is not happening. You see people going with 
a gun and mowing people down, and they will look at you as if they 
have done nothing!
Reconciliation takes transformation of both the victims and 
the perpetrators. After they have confessed, the spiritual rituals 
come in, such as the symbolic killing of the bull. They will eat from 
one bowl and drink from one pot. That is now to say, ‘We have to 
forgive each other.’ It is forgiven, but it is not forgotten. It means 
that you will not repeat it again.
Restoration focuses on the whole society. It will not only be 
these two people, the victim and the perpetrator, that people will 
focus on. That’s why it takes long—days and days—so that people 
can reach that restoration of community. 
What were the challenges facing Wunlit? One was the reluc-
tance of the SPLA, because the young people from both sides were 
their fighters. If there is peace, where will they get people who will 
fight for them? 
At this point, the war had broken down social structures, even 
the idea of local communities protecting human life. Institutions 
such as the age sets became disorganised and distorted. They 
became more of a military tool than an age group to defend the 
community. 
The achievement of Wunlit was its community, grassroots 
focus. The communities realised they were killing themselves, 
so they disengaged with the government—the SPLA. They said, 
‘Enough is enough, and we are not going to fight.’
The role of leaders was important. Salva Kiir Mayardit at the 
time took the initiative, when he was the second man to Dr John, 
although Dr John declined. The elders who were there talked 
very strongly to Salva, and in doing so, restored the institution of 
eldership.
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Wunlit also minimised inter-factional fighting, as the commu-
nities disengaged after the conference. As a result, leaders were 
deprived of fighters, the young people were not fighting for them 
any more. This made the reconciliation of leadership and the 
reunification of the SPLA possible.
The lessons we learned were the importance of traditional 
peace process and respect for the institution of elders, for the 
chiefs, and for the young people. When the young people are 
guided well by the elders, peace can come. Communities took 
control of their life. Our communities at that time said, ‘No more 
fighting. Even if Dr Riek or Dr Garang come, we resolved to fight 
no more.’ This broke that fear which was there; the elders spoke 
up, and the youth listened.
The indigenous peace process is still alive. It can still be 
revived. Restorative justice brings connectedness, and the whole 
community is to be restored, to be reformed, as the basis of recon-
ciliation among our people. 
Paride Taban
Peace is development
When the war started in 1983 it came first to Torit, where my 
diocese was and is. When the SPLA took a number of the towns, 
Bishop Nathanael Garang and I were the only two Bishops who 
were active in SPLA areas until 1990. That’s how the two of us 
came to found the New Sudan Council of Churches. 
We saved a lot of our young people, especially in 1991. When 
Mengistu was overthrown, we had 20,000 young children running 
from Ethiopia, and it was the NSCC who helped them. We chartered 
planes, dropping food in the forest. These people, children, were 
living on the wheat from over the water. Today, if there is respect 
for the church, especially for members of the NSCC, it is because 
of the lives that they saved then.
It was the NSCC which went lobbying all over Europe and 
America, making ecumenical forums with churches all over the 
world. We prayed even in the mosque and the synagogue, making 
friends with all God-loving people. We can say that this war was 
not won only by guns, but because of many hands put together 
and hearts put together in prayer.
Even today, the best schools and hospitals in the rural areas 
are run by the church. Go among the Murle, among the Jie, among 
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the Kachipo, among the Toposa: the best service comes from the 
church. We made boarding schools under the trees in the forest; 
we drilled over a thousand boreholes; we made a government 
area to be a ghost town, because people ran out behind the SPLA 
for services. 
When today, during war, people stop doing development work, 
I say these people are also warriors. If you stop providing devel-
opment to the people who are suffering, you are also making war. 
Peace is development is peace. Even now, there should be devel-
opment not only in government areas and also in the opposition 
areas, in order to quench the anger of the young people. They too 
need to be served.
The BBC used to ask me, ‘Bishop Taban, are you with the SPLA?’ 
I replied, ‘No! The SPLA are with me!’ I am not a rebel. The SPLA 
came and joined me. They are with me. I am there in my place, 
they came and joined me. 
The church didn’t surround itself with the gun, but with love 
and service. We never held a campaign for weapons. Rather, we 
campaigned for education, for food, for any humanitarian assistance. 
Khartoum bombed civilians in order to empty out areas, and 
people fled as refugees. But the church helped them to survive 
even in the caves, in the forest, everywhere. If the politicians are 
fish, the civil population are their water. When the water dries, the 
fish die. When the water gets hot, the fish also die. So they should 
be very careful of the population. 
Principles for peace
Forgiveness is one measure. Many people say that when you 
forgive, you’re a coward. But it’s not true. When you reconcile, 
when you forgive, you’re a brave and courageous person. Forgive-
ness is strength. 
Development is peace. If you want to be with the people, have 
two hands: one holding God, and the other holding humanity. If 
you fill your hands with power or with guns, you cannot hold God 
or humanity. 
Discussion: The silence of the elders
Venansio Muludiang, University of Juba: When I look back at what 
happened in December last year, I was surprised that our political 
elders kept quiet. The church elders spoke their minds about what 
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happened, but the elders did not. Now, the question is, how are we 
going to start the reconciliation process if the elders keep quiet?
Julia Duany: Why are the elders quiet? Our elders are in Juba, and 
they have become politicised. They are talking about the SPLM, 
they are not talking about the Bari tradition or the Dinka tradition, 
about respect or the keeping of humanity or the keeping of our 
communities. They’re not talking about that. They have decided 
to keep quiet and keep their jobs. 
I had the same question—‘Why are our elders keeping 
quiet?’—so I took it to some of them. The only one who gave me 
a reply said ‘Julia, there is a wall there. Nothing is going through.’ 
So maybe they have tried in their own way and couldn’t make it 
through; maybe the environment is different from the environ-
ment of Wunlit. 
But we have not lost Wunlit. We still can do it, through the 
mobilisation of our people. If we can mobilise, and even you youth 
can disengage and insist that, ‘We are not going to fight any more,’ 
like they did in Wunlit, then I think we can rescue South Sudan. But 
it’s up to you young people to disengage.
Census Lo-liyong: Is it possible that the recent conflicts we’ve seen 
have been caused in part by the fact several issues were not dealt 
with in the name of reconciliation?
Judith McCallum: When I came in 2006 I had a conversation with 
the Chairman at the time saying, ‘Why is the Peace Commis-
sion only the Peace Commission? It used to be the Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission.’ I was told, ‘Now is not the time for 
reconciliation,’ he said. ’Reconciliation can come when we have 
security.’
I think that’s where the mistake was. We let that dictate our 
activities, so the focus was on peace and security, but peace 
without reconciliation. I think if that reconciliation had been done 
earlier, a lot of these issues would not have festered.
Leben Moro: I’d like to ask our panel to think about the Wunlit 
process. What is one thing from that process that they regard as 
being very important taking into account the current situation, 
where reconciliation is very much needed?
John Ashworth: I think if there is one thing that we get from 
the whole people-to-people process, it is that it is a grassroots 
process. Yes, there has to be accountability. But not imposed 
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by the intellectuals or the elite or the human rights industry. It 
has to be imposed by the people. We have to ask the people, 
‘What do you mean by accountability and how it’s going to take 
place?’ 
The people-to-people process is well named. In any society, 
in any new situation, in any milieu, we have to go to the people. 
We have to have a process of consultation, awareness raising, 
mobilisation and peace making, reconciliation making, among the 
people. 
Naomi Pendle: One thing that was striking about the violence in 
December 2013 was the speed at which it spread. It started in Juba 
and then within ten days, it’s across a third of the country. This 
for me raises questions about how people who might be involved 
in a people-to-people process understand South Sudan? How 
do they find security? How do they find accountability? Wunlit 
maybe has some answers to these questions, but it also provokes 
more questions—how did we get from the peace of Wunlit to the 
violence we saw in December this last year? 
Bishop Paride Taban: It was the church. It was religious people. 
And these people are still there. We have to carry out this mission 
to the end. We are not to get afraid or to get frustrated. And we are 
to be patient. I think it will succeed. In our church, we have prayer 
every day for South Sudan. That is what we, the believers, have 
to do. There will be peace. There is a time for everything, even a 
time for suffering. 
Judith McCallum: For me the important aspect was that it was a 
process. I think the process that was started in Wunlit needed to 
be continued, and I hope that process can be restarted to focus on 
that social contact between the communities and whatever politi-
cians are in place. That has to be an on-going process. If it becomes 
a top-down approach to governance rather than a bottom-up 
approach to peace, that’s where we get sidetracked.
Julia Duany: Sometimes it’s very hard just to say what we can 
really do with Wunlit or what one thing we can take away from it. 
Even when we talk about traditional restoration and connected-
ness, justice, there is accountability in it. The person who has done 
wrong has to accept that he has done wrong. It is now very difficult 
in the current situation for those who have done wrong to accept 
that they have done wrong. 
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I consider that I have done my time, but I don’t want to leave 
my children a mess that we have created. So I will be the first one 
to apologise, and I will say ‘sorry’ for the mess we have done. We 
need to keep South Sudan for our young people.
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3. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005, was 
a set of six agreements between the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan, which brought 
an end to the Second Sudanese Civil War. The agreement promised 
a power-sharing arrangement between the SPLA and the National 
Congress Party (NCP), the establishment of a secular, semi-au-
tonomous South Sudan, equitable division of oil revenue, and a 
referendum on independence for the South.
David Deng
The CPA and the problem of Sudan
What I admire about the CPA is the extent to which it analysed the 
problem of Sudan and developed a solution to that problem. The 
problem consisted of a situation in which the peripheries of Sudan 
were marginalised and neglected by a small group in Khartoum, 
and this then contributed to inequalities and led to the conflict. 
Also, people looked at the crisis of identity in Sudan, and the way 
that this small minority in Khartoum looked down upon South 
Sudanese as third, fourth, fifth class citizens, despite the fact that 
they themselves had African blood. 
The solution was a ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model—the 
idea that Sudan would be administered as two separate regions. 
Southern Sudan would be given a degree of regional autonomy, 
representation in the government and a share in national wealth, 
elections midway through the interim period that then provided an 
opportunity for the democratic transformation of the North, and 
an opportunity to build institutions in the South. Over the six-year 
interim period, the North was given an opportunity to make unity 
attractive and to convince South Sudanese of the value of staying 
united as a country; if that failed, then South Sudanese were given 
the opportunity to vote in a referendum to secede. That’s a very 
clear analysis of the problem, at least from the perspective of 
South Sudan.
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Did it solve all the problems of the country? Clearly not. But 
you nevertheless had a targeted approach to solving the problem 
of conflict in Sudan at the time. 
Looking back, I wonder whether our expectations of what the 
CPA could provide weren’t too high. At the time, the agreement 
was sold as the solution to all the problems of Sudan. People 
thought, ‘after the referendum, everything will be fine. We’ll be 
free of the North and there will be no more problems. We’ll be 
living in prosperity and freedom.’
Clearly, history has shown that this wasn’t the case. But the 
referendum was enough to dissuade large-scale violence at the 
level that we’re seeing now. I think in large part that’s due to 
everyone looking to the referendum as a common goal. At the 
time, this was enough to dissuade violence.
However, there are some core, fundamental issues that were 
not addressed. One was constitutional reform. If we look at the 
way the Transitional Constitution was drafted at the last minute 
by a small group of people and imposed on the country, it was 
clear that during this transition after the CPA, there wasn’t careful 
thought given to building the social contract, or to issues of nation- 
building. Another issue is that of reconciliation, which was put off. 
These issues raise an important point about what we can 
expect from transitions. A peace agreement and a transitional 
period, however long, are not going to solve all the problems of 
South Sudan. The point of a peace agreement is to bring enough 
space for people to have the conversation that they need to have 
in order to settle these issues and then to have true peace, not 
merely an absence of violence.
On the issue of reconciliation, there was a window of oppor-
tunity in the CPA to address it. Article 1.7 of the power-sharing 
protocol touched on the issue of reconciliation in the CPA:
The parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of 
national reconciliation and healing throughout the country as 
part of the peace-building process. Its mechanisms and forms 
shall be worked out by the Government of National Unity.9
Such initiatives could have begun to address the legacies of 
violence in the country. However, the process was never really 
fully taken up. As they are currently framed, these processes are 
not enough to deal with the complexity of the crisis within South 
Sudan.
9. Protocol Between 
the Government of the 
Sudan (GOS) and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) on Power 
Sharing, Naivasha, Kenya, 
2004, Article 1.7.
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The CPA had this strong analysis of the conflict, but it neglected 
some of these other key elements. 
What does that mean for us in our current context? I think the 
first thing we have to do is to understand what the problem of 
South Sudan is. 
We can no longer rely on a narrative of marginalisation and 
neglect, because the groups which are now in Arusha, negotiating 
a reconciliation, are the very same ones who have been leading 
the country in a position of power for ten years. 
Legacies of violence destabilise a new nation like South Sudan 
in multiple ways.
Firstly, through a lack of respect for laws of war. As much as we 
may hate it, war is not illegal. That’s why rules have developed to 
guide how wars are fought, be that under international human-
itarian law or under the local, customary laws of the people 
concerned. 
As we learn from the CPA, It’s important that our expectations 
not be set too high but, if we approach it systematically, thoroughly, 
and honestly, and we make a real effort to address some of these 
core issues that went unaddressed in the last peace agreement, I 
think there is a way to build something lasting. 
Census Lo-liyong
The role of women
The two agreements that we have already studied highlight the 
various failures and missed opportunities of the CPA process. 
When we look at the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, its successes 
show the weakness of the CPA: the deal was citizen-led, in contrast 
to the party-led mechanics we see in the CPA period; people were 
integrated within the new government based on merit, rather than 
on their liberator credentials.
Similarly, if we look at the Wunlit peace meeting: It was a tradi-
tional-led process, rather than outsider-driven; women were a key 
aspect of the agreement; truth telling was essential, and commu-
nities acknowledged their responsibility for the fighting. 
Even though, by the CPA period, the Southern region was far 
more integrated than it had been, the CPA was an agreement 
exclusively between two parties. Non-party stakeholders, espe-
cially women, had to fight to make their presence known. 
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Have women benefited from the CPA? The agreement made 
provision for 25 per cent of all government posts to be held by 
women. But within that 25 per cent, how many of those posts have 
been filled based on the competence of those women, in terms 
of their ability to carry out their duties very well, as opposed to 
the roles they played in their communities during the liberation 
period. 
For many, their survival in the political realm is based on loyalty. 
The freedom to put an idea forward simply because it is right does 
not fully exist yet. When certain issues are brought forward—and 
not just for the women—they are silenced if not considered as 
within the party line. This limits the development of South Sudan.
Women have a strong role as peacemakers in South Sudan. 
Women may marry across tribes; they have a lot of influence and 
are more aware of various issues. There are women’s groups who 
have gone across to other areas at war and been able to reach 
other women to understand the full impact of the war.
We have a long way to go in terms of peace, and peace is a 
long-term process. But grassroots mechanisms must be taken into 
consideration. It is not just about those who are there putting the 
agreement together, but those who are in the communities, in the 
villages, holding the guns, and what future they see for themselves 
without development.
Don Bosco Malish
The role of donors
What am I looking at? I would like to look at the role of donors and 
aid programming during the negotiation and the implementation 
of the CPA. 
The donor support that came into this country came in different 
forms. It arrived as food relief, as medicine, as financial assistance 
and as technical assistance. Some sections of our government 
received direct budgetary support—some continue to receive it. 
And some came in terms of capacity building. 
The application of this assistance was reflected in the CPA 
during the negotiation process and something similar happened 
during the implementation. Personally, I expected that, during the 
implementation, the support we received from donors would go 
towards strengthening the relation between the nation and the 
state. 
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The nation—the people—has a relationship with the state. In 
order to enforce this contract the people need capacity. However, 
during the implementation of the peace agreement, support to 
civil society was inadequate, and the agenda for that support was 
not set by civil society. The agenda was set by somebody else, and 
civil society was subcontracted to implement it. 
Donor funding was welcomed by the state, and it was used to 
advance the development agenda, while wealth from our natural 
resources were diverted into private pockets. We know that 192 
km of our highway was donated to us—not paid for by our oil 
revenues. And civil society had no capacity to seek accountability. 
Corruption was visible, rampant, and went unchecked. Yet the 
watchdog of government, civil society, was missing. Aid program-
ming turned out to be very bureaucratic; NGOs were managing the 
recipients of their grants rather than the grants themselves, more 
concerned about the processes than the intended outcomes.
We also discovered that we, in our civil society organisations, 
appeared more legitimate in the eyes of our communities than 
our government, because we were the ones providing for their 
needs. There is an effect that I call a substitution effect. When 
we launch schools, open clinics, and so on, we substituted for the 
government. This left our people poor, and many of them are now 
enduring conflicts as a result. Everybody at the local level wants 
to be a commissioner so that they can profit from that unchecked 
money. 
As we proceed with the on-going negotiations, how do we as 
civil society and members of our community organise ourselves 
so that we have a voice in the next round of support that comes 
to the country? How do we begin informing others so that the aid 
we receive is needs-driven rather than just supplied? How do we 
inform the development agenda? For us to do that, we need to 
protect our space. 
Douglas Johnson
An inadequate agreement
What we have to remember about the CPA is that it was a peace 
agreement to bring an end to a war, but it was also a political 
settlement to resolve the long-standing political conflict in Sudan 
that had remained unresolved since before independence. 
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The CPA did not, in my view, analyse the political issues in 
Sudan adequately. It certainly focused on the political issues for 
the South, but it ignored the political conflict that had long ceased 
to be a North–South conflict. There were other areas of conflict 
that were deliberately left out of the CPA. This allowed Khartoum 
to attempt separate accords with different groups, whether they 
were regional groups, like the East or Darfur, or political oppo-
sition. This enabled them, in effect, to safeguard their position 
within the CPA while diluting the position of the opposition. 
Was the problem in the provisions of the CPA or its implemen-
tation? I think that most of the speakers here have been focusing 
on the problems of implementation, with which I agree. 
The interim period could not overtly prepare for separation 
and full disengagement, because the framework required that 
both the government in Khartoum and in Juba pay lip service to the 
unity of the country. Everybody knew what was going to happen 
when the referendum took place. The real question was, would 
the referendum take place? That it did, is the real success of the 
CPA. There are other problems, however, that remain unresolved.
There wasn’t any real preparation for disengagement along the 
border. South Sudan cannot be fully secure and at peace with itself 
as long as the border peoples on both sides of the border are not 
also at peace. 
There was also a lack of preparation for peace within South 
Sudan—there was no internal reconciliation. This was the biggest 
failure of the Government of South Sudan during the interim 
period. They should have anticipated, as many people did antic-
ipate, that without internal reconciliation—and not just between 
the men with guns, but between the different societies—there 
would be no peace in South Sudan, whatever the result of the 
referendum. 
Others have articulated what needs to be done, and I agree 
with them. South Sudan can no longer rely on the narrative of 
marginalisation. It now must look inside itself, into the heart of 
South Sudan, into the heart of South Sudanese societies, to find 
out what has gone wrong.
Discussion: The lessons of the past
Taban Lo-liyong: I want to point out that in Kenya, we did not 
negotiate peace for South Sudan. In Kenya, we ended our journey 
to nationhood. So it was not that we were fighting for something 
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which could only be ended by peace. We wanted to be indepen-
dent, and we got our independence by fighting for it—twice. Of 
course it ended with the referendum. But that is a different thing 
altogether. 
What we have now is a civil war inside a new nation of South 
Sudan. So the resolution of this war will be different from all our 
other resolutions. We are now resolving issues of nationhood 
within our own nation. 
We need to find out who we are and ask whether we want 
to exist and survive as a nation, realising that we got, through 
the referendum, a nation of South Sudan. This is what we should 
concentrate our opinion on. After our independence, how do we 
live together as a nation?
Christopher Oringa Mark, University of Juba: It was said that the 
rate of human rights violations and abuse under the CPA was not 
as high as what we see now. Why do you think, right now, we are 
seeing so many human rights violations and abuses?
David Deng: For the most part, I would say, the referendum had a 
quieting effect on people. It kept people who actually had quite a 
lot of hatred for one another together for long enough to make it 
to the independence that people sought. But once independence 
is no longer a uniting issue, those same hatreds resurface.
Leo Onek, University of Juba, Associate Professor/Dean: I believe 
that simplicity is a mark of genius. The Anyanya message of the 
first civil war was very simple: South Sudanese wanted to be 
free. Enter the SPLM, and even now, we do not know what their 
ideology is: a united Sudan, a separate South, a New Sudan? It was 
very confusing, even to the practitioners! 
Census Lo-liyong: I am not an SPLM member. But if you read some 
of Dr John Garang’s speeches, he stated, ‘It is easy to make unity 
attractive, or for us to make a vehicle for separation.’ Some of us 
are still grappling with whether that has been successful. 
Douglas Johnson: I think there is a danger of romanticising the 
Anyanya period. Because, prior to 1970, the Anyanya were frag-
mented, and they were often fighting each other. We asked Oliver 
Albino two nights ago, ‘Why, when the SSLM claimed to be fighting 
for separation, did they agree to negotiate on the terms of unity 
of one nation?’ And he said, ‘That’s because everybody in South 
‘We need to find out 
who we are and ask 
whether we want 
to exist and survive 
as a nation … This 
is what we should 
concentrate out 
opinion on. After our 
independence, how 
do we live together 
as a nation? ‘
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Sudan wanted federation. They were singing songs of federation 
in the villages.’ So it wasn’t such a simple matter as you now think. 
Also, at the beginning of the Southern Regional Government, 
there was a big argument about the ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’. 
Who were getting the jobs? Was it the insiders who had not fought, 
or the outsiders who had? These problems didn’t just start with 
the SPLM.
Wani Stephen: In comparing the CPA and the peace agreement 
signed recently, there are still loopholes that remain which give a 
lot of power to political elites who have caused a lot of injustice in 
this country. For how long shall we continue seeing such ‘peace’? 
David Deng: I think the space for discussion about these issues 
is now ripe in that, in the past, there was really no room to have 
these kinds of conversations. When people tried to initiate some 
People-to-People processes after the CPA, they were told by the 
Government, ‘Now isn’t the time for reconciliation. What you talk 
about is peace and security.’
But now we have some room to begin considering these issues. 
It’s important that we take advantage of the momentum that there 
is now in order to initiate the discussion. Instead, if we shy away 
and we feel like it’s too contentious, we’ll miss our opportunity.
John Ryle: What is the one important thing, either from the CPA or 
from the other peace agreements that have been examined, that 
you think it’s vital to keep in mind, either a negative or a positive, 
during the current peace discussions. What can be rescued from 
history? 
Douglas Johnson: I think a popular voice is needed. One thing that 
Oliver Albino said is that one of the reasons that the SSLM ratified 
the Addis Ababa agreement was they received comments from the 
people. It would have been a dereliction of duty for people who 
claimed to be leaders not to listen to that popular support. We 
need to hear a popular voice during these current negotiations. 
Census Lo-liyong: Many consider this current war an act of 
revenge between the Dinka and Nuer, without understanding the 
62 other tribes who have their own issues with the SPLA or with 
other groups. This means the solution they are looking for will not 
work for long.
Don Bosco Malish: I think we need to avoid celebrating our liber-
ators. We need to take them to task. Whatever they agree to 
 ‘I think we need to 
avoid celebrating 
our liberators. We 
need to take them 
to task. Whatever 
they agree to should 
be implemented. 
There should not 
be a selective 
implementation of 
the agreement.’
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should be implemented. There should not be a selective imple-
mentation of the agreement—if they agree to reconcile, it should 
be a genuine reconciliation, not a question of bringing your enemy 
closer to control him, but real reconciliation from the heart. Let’s 
take them to task. 
We have a future for this country, we have children. I was born 
in a war, I grew up in a war, my children are growing up in a war. 
Am I also going to hand them war? That’s the question we need 
to ask ourselves.
David Deng: I think mine is the question of how to take ownership 
over the peace, and how to help people assume ownership and 
responsibility. For the CPA, it was easy. We were given the referen-
dum, which everyone could buy into. But now, in any agreement 
that we see coming, it’s not going to have that same gift. It will take 
a lot more work for people to assume ownership.
An agreement alone is only the beginning. It takes a lot of work 
for people to do the grassroots mobilisation and conduct frank, 
candid discussions peacefully in order to turn the silencing of guns 
into a sustainable, long-term peace.
‘We need to hear 
a popular voice 
during these current 
negotiations.’ 
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Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases
AACC All-African Council of Churches
Anyanya Southern Sudanese guerrilla separatist 
movement; lit. ‘snake venom’
beny bith (Dinka) spiritual elder or spearmaster
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DUP Democratic Unionist Party
ICC International Criminal Court
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development
koc hakuma (Dinka) people of the government
koc bai (Dinka) people of the home
kuaar muon (Nuer) spiritual elder or earth priest
MCF Movement for Colonial Freedom
NCP National Congress Party
NSCC New Sudan Council of Churches
TMC Transitional Military Council 
SANU Sudan African National Union
SCC Sudan Council of Churches
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army
SPLM-DC Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-
Democratic Change
SPLM-IO Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement-in-Opposition
SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces
SSLM Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
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SSPG Southern Sudan Provisional 
Government
SSU Sudanese Socialist Union 
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan
WCC World Council of Churches
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Federalism in the history 
of South Sudanese political 
thought
This research paper discusses 
South Sudanese attitudes 
towards federalism, and the way 
it was presented from Sudan’s 
independence to today.
The Economics of Elections in 
Somaliland: The financing of 
political parties and candidates
Examining the 2005 parliamentary 
and 2012 local council elections, 
this paper concludes that conceiving 
of elections solely as exercises in 
democratic representation, ignores a 
broader social and economic reality.
The National Army and Armed 
Groups in the Eastern Congo: 
Untangling the Gordian knot of 
insecurity
An analysis of armed mobilization, 
the FARDC, and efforts in demobi-
lization and army reform. Aussi en 
français.
My Mother Will Not Come to 
Juba: South Sudanese debate 
the making of the constitution
Debates at Juba University on 
the new constitution, examining 
challenges, reasons for delay, and 
questions of public participation in 
constitution-making.
Between Somaliland and 
Puntland: Marginalization, 
militarization and conflicting 
political visions
An analysis of the political evolution 
of Somaliland and Puntland, their 
competing political visions and 
those living in between the two 
polities.
The Sudan Handbook
A guide to Sudan and South Sudan 
and the historical processes that 
shaped them, written by leading 
specialists and edited by John Ryle, 
Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo and Jok 
Madut Jok. 
Les Banyamulenge: Insurrection 
et exclusion dans les 
montagnes du Sud-Kivu
Ce rapport examine les Banyamu-
lenge, communauté Tutsi congolaise 
se trouvant au coeur des multiples 
conflits dans l’est de la RDC. Also 
available in English.
ةّيلود ًادودح ةيلخادلا ةيرادلاا دودلحا ريصت امنيح
 ىلع  ،يبونلجاو  يلامشلا  ،ْيناَدوسلا  لوح  رئادلا  شاقنلا  زكر
 ًاعوضوم ريرقتلا  صحفيو  .امهنيب  دودلحا  طخ ريم نيأ  ةلاسم
 يـضارلاا  ناكس  ىلع  ةديدلجا  دودحلل  لمتلمحا  رـثلأا  :وه  رخآ
.ةّيدودلحا
When Boundaries Become Borders is also available in 
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The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, 
politics and history in the 
north–south boundary zone of 
western Sudan
First published in 2010, this report 
tells the story of the people of Kafia 
Kingi and Raga, and describes the 
choices they face today.
‘My mother will not come to Juba;  
she is waiting where she is— 
but she is waiting for you.’
In December 2013, South Sudan descended into conflict. Peace 
initiatives over the following eighteen months culminated in 
an agreement between government and armed opposition, 
signed in August 2015. While the agreement came into effect 
in late 2015, many uncertainties surround its implementation. 
Do previous conflicts and agreements hold useful lessons? 
Academics, activists and church representatives discussed 
this topic with an audience of students and members of the 
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Institute, supported by the Danish Institute for International 
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TOO LONG TO BE DECEIVED. TO THE BEST OF 
OUR ABILITY, WE DID WHAT WE COULD.’
Danish Institute for
International Studies
